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RENDERED IMPRACTICABLE: 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE 
IMPRACTICABILITY DOCTRINE 
Aaron J. Wright* 
INTRODUCTION 
Impracticability is about change.^ The doctrine reconciles changed 
circumstances, discharging contractual obligations when events 
surrounding the contract vary dramatically from expectations.^ Ideally, 
impracticability sets parameters for such circumstances, including how 
drastic the change must be to justify discharge.^ Yet despite centuries 
of development, the eurrent impractieability doctrine lacks a theoretical 
foundation, leading to inconsistent ease holdings^ and doctrinal 
* Editor in Chief, Cardozo Law Review, J.D. Candidate (June 2005); Tufts University, B.A. 
I would like to thank Professor Paul Shupack for instilling in me a passion for contract law and 
Professor Dan Crane for his thoughtful guidance. Moreover, I would like to thank Mike 
Reisman, Rob Lefkowitz, Peter Melamed, and Benjamin Friedman for their superior editmg. 
would also like to thank my mother, sister, and father for being a constant source of inspiration 
and love, and importantly Alissa for her boundless love and unquestioned support, especially 
during the past year. , ^ 
1 Cook V. Deltona Corp., 753 F.2d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[Cjhange is what 
impossibility is about."). . . .,. , AW, 
2 See infra Part 1 for an elaborate history of the impracticability doctrine, and ttie 
circumstances under which the impracticability doctrine excuses contractual obligations 
3 For a variety of theories discussing when discharge should be granted, see Andrew Kull, 
Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L J. 1 
(1991)' Pietro Trimarchi, Commercial Impracticability in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 
11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 63 (1991); Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract 
Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1988); Victor R 
Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 100 
(1988); Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225 
(1987); Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL 
L REV. 617 (1983); John Henry Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and 
Frustrating Things—The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419 
(1969); E. Allan Famsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 
(1968)' Harold J Herman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in 
International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1963). For a detailed analysis of examining 
whether discharge is ever warranted, see Alan O. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial 
Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 }. LEGAL STUD. 42 (1990). 
4 See generally John D. Wladis, Impracticability as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed 
Circumstances Upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 OA. L. REV. 503, 600-25 
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confusion.5 Today, courts rarely find circumstances satisfying the 
modem requirements of impracticability.^ The rigid requirements of 
foreseeability and the common law concept of impossibility limit the 
impracticability doctrine's ability to provide "flexible adjustment 
machinery,"^ leading scholars to lament that "the court must exercise its 
equity powers and pray for the wisdom of Solomon" when dealing with 
the mle.^ 
Legal economists have examined the impracticability doctrine 
since the late 1960s.9 Applying traditional miero-economic theory, 
these scholars have questioned whether the impracticability doctrine 
promotes efficient exchanges by lowering transaction costs associated 
with bargaining.'" In 1977, two such approaches appeared 
consecutively in the Journal of Legal Studies, reaching two contrary 
results. In an influential article written by Richard Posner and Andrew 
(1988) (listing an extensive table of cases that involve factually similar factual situations which 
resulted in different judicial outcomes). 
5 See Stephen J. Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and 
Impossibility: Part I, 14 UCC L.J. 30, 31 (1981) (stating that "[jjudicial developments of the 
doctrine [of impossibility] under Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
common law is largely incoherent"). As aptly explained by James White and Robert Summers: 
In spite of attempts by all of the contract scholars ... it remains impossible to predict 
with accuracy how the [impracticability doctrine] will apply to a variety of relatively 
common cases. Both the cases and the Code commentary are full of weasel words 
such as "severe" shortage, "marked" increase, "basic" assiunptions, and "force 
majeure." 
1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-10 (4th ed. 1995). 
6 Steven L. Schooner explains: 
Until [1980]. . . challenges invoking section 2-615's protection made for an almost 
unbroken succession of failures The recovery obstacles posed by the Code prove 
equally insurmountable to those encountered at common law. Judged in hindsight, 
foreseeability and risk allocation appear obvious and the occurrence of a contingency 
so often seems not extraordinary. 
Steven L. Schooner, Impossibility of Performance in Public Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 16 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 229, 235 n.39 (1986) (citations omitted). 
7 U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. 5 (1996). 
8 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE 
WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 1333 (rev. ed. 1962). 
9 See generally Robert L. Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for 
Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 
1393 (1969); Note, The Economic Implications of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 
1251 (1975); Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the 
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, 
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
83 (1977); Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 311 (1982). Each analysis acknowledges the contributions of predecessors, while 
adding unique interpretations and analysis. 
19 One main purpose of law and economics is to examine legal doctrine and evaluate its 
economic efficiency, which is accomplished in the context of contract law by lowering the 
transaction costs of bargaining. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-28 
(6th ed. 2003) (asserting that an economic analysis of the law explains rules of law by examining 
their relative economic efficiency, under a theory dubbed the "efficiency theory of the common 
law"). 
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Rosenfield, the authors rejected the current rule encapsulated under 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-615, proposing in its place the 
"superior risk bearer" model. Paul Joskow, in contrast, used the same 
micro-economic insights to support § 2-615 and argued that the rule 
strikes a balance between the rigid rule of enforcing all contracts and a 
lenient excuse doctrine. 
However, recent scholarship from the emerging field of behavioral 
economics has altered our understanding of the way people traditionally 
imderstand risk assessment and rationality. Over the past twenty-five 
See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 89-92. Generally, the superior risk bearer is the 
party that is the more efficient bearer of a particular risk, regardless of the party's ability to 
prevent the risk fi'om materializing. Id. at 90. Details of the superior risk bearer model are found 
infra Part III. 
12 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 154-55, 163. Joskow discusses how a well designed 
impracticability doctrine reduces transaction costs associated with contracting by reducing 
litigation costs and preventing extensive negotiations. After a micro-economic analysis, Joskow 
asserts that U.C.C § 2-615 is such a doctrine. Joskow's interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-615's 
foreseeability test is fotmd in Part II infra. 
13 The field of behavioral law and economics is quickly emerging. Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky provide a detailed overview of this field in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000), as does Cass Sunstein in BEHAVIORAL LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (2000). Other prominent articles include: Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas 
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2002). 
Scholars have increasingly applied behavioral economics to contract law. See, e.g., Robert 
A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated 
Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000); Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of 
Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998); 
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract's Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 
(1998); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological 
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995). 
Behavioral economics has also been applied to criminal and tort law. See, e.g., Alon Harel 
& Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected 
Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276 (1999); Edward J. 
McCaffery et al.. Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 
VA.L.REV. 1341 (1995). 
Recently, scholars have employed behavioral economics to understand the corporate form, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and corporate law in general. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, 
Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, 
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); A. Mechele Dickerson, A 
Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2003); 
Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense o/Smith v. Van 
Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 675 (2002). 
The provocative nature of behavioral economics has also generated criticism. See, e.g., 
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New 
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Rational 
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998). Moreover, 
behavioral economics has infiltrated non-academic forums. See Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit 
of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, § 6, at 44 (discussing new research in behavioral 
economics). 
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years, economists have increasingly utilized research fro" P^osy 
and other social sciences to argue that humans possess bounded 
rationality,and rely on heuristics,which are distorted by 
coenitive biases including over-optimism,the hindsight bias, and 
the confirmation bias." These behavioral insights the 
that people make subjective probability assessments that differ from 
objective probability of a given risk.^^ 
Armed with the insights of behavioral economics, ^ J 
examine micro-economic approaches to the impracticabi ity doctrine 
proffered by Posner and Rosenfield, and Joskow, and will ar^e that 
heuristics and cognitive biases undermine the foreseeability test 
encapsulated in § 2-615.20 Moreover, this Note will arpe that a 
eSamtive analysis similar to the one articulated under the supenor 
risk bearer test provides a starting point to create a workable, consisten 
Standard by limiting the effects of cognitive biases on the 
impracticability doctrine.^' 
14 Herbert A. Simon, ^ Behavioral Model for Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955> 
Bounded rationality refers to the theory that rational ^ho'ce ^es ^ ® ^ ^ible 
limitations of the decision maker, meaning M. at 99-
states of the world or all 1955. J. Simon criticized economists 
^Le'lllmoTeirmrsrhavTnU 
economics, which are pertinent to dlis Note. Tinder Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
predictable now than mactaality.^ ty ' part III examines the hindsight 
.no—, tapuo.» 
hindsight bias. D.V,.. J JIhiauitous Phenomenon in Many 
information in ways that are partial to t ose e le „ .pj^ confirmation bias along 
suggests that the confirmation bias is "extensive and shong^ W. The contirma 
i r p ^ — i n  t h e  i o g n l  . , « »  »  „ . . = d  u p o n  »  • » »  « > =  P ' o b " - '  »  
™T,i"™Sfon».,io. on .ho —bill., „s. unto U-C.C. S Z.bld. >« "/™ » ™ 
21 See infra Part III.D. 
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Part I will outline the development of the impracticability doctrine 
from the common law impossibility doctrine to its codification in the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Part II will discuss the impracticability 
doctrine as interpreted through traditional micro-economics. Part III 
will examine how pertinent aspects of behavioral economics undermine 
reliance on an absolute foreseeability test. Moreover, this section will 
examine how cognitive biases and heuristics affect the superior risk 
bearer test, and will suggest a new, workable, direction for the 
impracticability doctrine. 
I. THE IMPRACTICABILITY DOCTRINE 
Impracticability arises as a defense when "the real world has in 
some way failed to correspond with the imaginary world hypothesized 
by the parties to the contract."22 jhe modem impracticability 
doctrine—now encapsulated in the Uniform Commercial Code^^— 
developed over several centuries,^^ emerging out of an Anglo-American 
common law that initially resisted its development.^^ 
Embedded in early English common law was the rigid principle of 
pacta sunt servanda^^ which absolutely bound parties to contractual 
obligations.^^ English courts generally refused to allow for excuse even 
when performance beeame impossible or frustrated by an unanticipated 
supervening event.^s As the court bluntly declared in Paradine v. 
22 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 81 (1974). 
23 Drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code updated the common law impossibility doctrine, 
and securely placed it in one section, U.C.C. § 2-615. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 
3-10, for a general discussion outlining the requirements of § 2-615 section, and common 
instances when impracticability is invoked. 
24 For a concise outline of the evolution of the impossibility doctrine see CORBIN, supra note 
8, § 1320. 
25 See William H. Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 
MICH. L. REV. 589, 591 (1920) (stating that the impossibility doctrine had difficulties "getting a 
foothold in the English law. Misleading analogies, followed by reception of foreign legal 
principles, followed by other misleading analogies, have combined that the doctrine of 
impossibility is left alive, it is at times hard even for its friend to recognize it"). 
26 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (7th ed. 1999) (stating that pacta sunt servanda 
means "agreements and stipulations of the parties (to a contract) must be observed ). For an 
altemate definition, see United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that pacta sunt servanda means "agreements must be obeyed"). 
27 For more information on the history of pacta sunt servanda and its role in American 
common law and continental civil law, see Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 
34 VA. J. INT'LL. 405 (1994). 
28 See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647) (finding a tenant who was forcibly 
evicted from leased property by an invading German army obligated to continue paying rent. The 
court reasoned that since the tenant did not condition his promise to pay on his continued peaceful 
enjoyment of the land, the law would not protect him beyond his own agreement). But see John 
D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of 
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JaneP "when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge 
upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding 
any accident by inevitable necessity, because he may have provided 
against it by his contract."^" Under this early view, parties entering into 
a contract remained bound, even when faced with uncontrollable 
circumstances, such as natural disaster and death. 
Between 1860 and 1920, English courts chipped away at the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, firmly establishing limited 
exceptions.Drawing from the ancient Roman concept of obligation 
de certo,^^ courts developed common law impossibility doctrine as an 
exception to rigid enforcement of contracts, most notably in Hyde v. 
Dean of Windsor^^ and Taylor v. Caldwell?'^ Hyde introduced the 
concept of implied conditions, suggesting in dictum that a contract 
discharges in the event of a promisor's death.^^ Taylor expanded such 
implied conditions, excusing both parties upon the destruction of a 
physical structure necessary for the contract's performance.^® 
In Taylor, the court found Caldwell, the owner of a concert hall, 
not liable to Taylor, an impresario who rented the hall, because just 
prior to the engagement the building burnt to the ground.^' The court 
reasoned that the continued existence of the hall constituted an implied 
condition under the contract, stating that "in contracts in which the 
performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or 
thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance 
arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse 
performance."^^ Thus, the court discharged Taylor's obligation to pay 
Caldwell, and Caldwell's duty to pay damages to Taylor for non-
delivery.39 
After Taylor, the common law impossibility doctrine excused 
nonperformance in the following situations: (1) when the contract's 
Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575, 1579-88 (1987) 
(arguing that courts misinterpret the meaning of Paradine v. Jane, and in fact the court did not 
hold that the general rule of contractual discharge is no excuse). 
29 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647). 
30 Id at 897. 
31 See Wladis, supra note 28, at 1593 ("Between 1860 and 1920, the English judiciary 
proceeded to erode significantly the strict view of excuse . . . ."). 
32 The texts of the Roman law on the subject of the obligation de certo state: '"If a promise 
has been made to deliver the slave Stichus on a certain day, and he dies before that day the 
promisor is not bound.'" Page, supra note 25, at 598 (citing DIGEST, lib. XLV, tit. 1, 1. 33). 
33 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (Q.B. 1597). 
34 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863). 
33 Hyde, 78 Eng. Rep. at 798. In Hyde, the court stated that no cause of action exists for 
breach of contract where the promisor died before fulfilling his agreement, even though the 
contract did not provide for the promisor's death. Id. 
36 Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep at 315. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 314. 
39 Id. at 39. 
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subject matter—a specific person or thing—^became unavailable;'"^ (2) 
when English law made performance illegal;"' and (3) when a clause m 
the contract provided for excuse."^ Gradually, however, English courts 
expanded the impossibility doctrine to other cases, including situations 
where unknown pre-existing causes precluded the agreement's 
performance."^ . . . , 
English courts continued to stretch the impossibility doctnne m the 
early twentieth century, developing the closely related frustration 
doctrine."" The fmstration doctrine traces back to the coronation 
cases,"^ most notably Krell v. HenryIn Krell, a lessee rented several 
40 See Williams v. Lloyd, 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1692) (stating that a promise to deliver a 
particular horse was excused when, prior to delivery and without fault of the promisor, the horse 
took sick and died). InHall v. Wright, 120 Eng. Rep. 688, 690 (1858), the court stated that: 
[W]here a contract depends upon personal skill, and the act of God renders it 
impossible, as, for instance, in the case of a painter employed to paint a picture who is 
struck blind, it may be that the performance might be excused, and his death might also 
have the same effect. 
41 See. e.g., Brewster v. Kitchin, 91 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1110 (K.B. 1697) ("[W]here a man 
covenants not to do a thing which was lawful for him to do, and an Act of Parliament comes after 
and compels him to do it; there the Act repeals the covenants; and vice versa."). 
42 See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647). The co^M holds this implicitly 
when it states: "because he might have provided against it by his contract." 
43 See Abbot of Westminster v. Gierke, 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (K.B. 1536) (holding that a promise 
to sell a building was excused, because unknown to either party, the building had burned down 
prior to the execution of the sales agreement). r , x; < n 
44 See Richard W. Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability: Courts Begin to Shape § 2-613, il 
Bus. LAW. 1089, 1090 (1977) ("In the century which followed, English courts stretched the 
concept of the implied condition in contract impossibility cases beyond those of total destruction. 
A first cousin, not in any way requiring impossibility, was bom of the doctrine.'). It is interesting 
to note that some commentators believe that no American court of last resort has expressly 
followed the doctrine of fmstration when making its decision. See. e.g., Nicholas K Weiskop, 
Frustration of Contractual Purpose—Doctrine or Mythl, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 239, ( )' 
Arthur Anderson, Frustration of Contract—A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, (1953). 
45 Coronation cases refer to contract disputes resulting from the cancellation of King Edward 
VIl's coronation ceremonies. As Andrew Kull describes: 
The coronation of King Edward Vll was to be celebrated by processions through the 
streets of London on June 26 and 27, 1902, with a naval review and "illumination of 
the fleet" to be held at Spithead (near the Isle of Wight) on June 28. Many contracts 
were entered into in anticipation of these festivities. Some owners or tenants of 
property commanding a good view of the parade route hired out rooms at high prices, 
others built grandstands, had tickets printed and sold seats; shipowners chartered 
vessels to organizers of pleasure cmises, who offered the public the opportunity to 
observe the naval exercises. Many of those hiring rooms or chartering ships 
subsequently contracted with caterers to supply refreshments to their paying or invited 
guests. The contracts memorializing these arrangements employed a predictable 
variety of payment terms: some required full payment in advance, others payment in 
installments, with final payment due in some cases on the day of the great event and in 
others some time before. Few of them contained any provision to govem the nghts of 
the parties in the event the celebrations did not take place. 
Kull, supra note 3, at 22. For a detailed case-by-case examination of the coronation cases, and 
their role in shaping the common law impossibility doctrine, see R.G. McElroy & Glanville 
Williams, The Coronation Cases, 4 MOD. L. REV. 241 (1941). 
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apartments overlooking the eoronation route of King Edward 
Due to the King's unexpected illness, the coronation was eancelled.^s 
When the lessee refused to pay the agreed rent, the lessor sued.^^ 
Relying on Taylor, the court extended the impracticability doctrine^o by 
reasoning that the purpose of the contract, given all circumstances, was 
for the lessee to witness the King's coronation.^i Since the parties at the 
time of formation failed to contemplate the King's illness and the illness 
frustrated the contract's purpose, the court discharged the lessee's 
obligation to pay.^^ 
As evidenced in both Taylor and Krell, the common law 
impossibility doctrine required objective proof to discharge a party from 
contractual performance.^^ Any objective possibility of successful 
performance ruled out impossibility as an excuse. Strictly enforced, this 
standard occasionally led to unmerciful results.^'' However, as 
commercial trade expanded in the twentieth century, the objective 
impossibility standard blurred^^ as some courts interpreted the 
impossibility doctrine in light of prevailing business practices. A 
relaxed alternative view of impossibility emerged, resting on the 
"6 2 K.B. 740 (1903). 
47 Id. at 740. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 746-57. 
Id 311^6. 
52 Id. 
55 See In re Smoot, 82 U.S. 36, 46 (1872) ("As between individuals, the impossibility which 
releases a man from the obligation to perform his contract, must be a real impossibility, and not a 
mere inconvenience."); Fast, Inc. v. Shaner, 183 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1950) ("If an elderly 
judge, for good consideration, promises to run 100 yards in 10 seconds and then fails to perform 
he can hardly be held to puff out the defense that he could not possibly run that fast... there is a 
difference between 'the thing cannot be done' and '1 cannot do it.'"). 
54 See Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). In Beebe, an individual 
contractually agreed to obtain a Canadian patent for an American citizen. Id. Canadian law 
forbade the issuance of patents to non citizens. The court refused to excuse performance, 
reasoning that the law might someday change. Id. The court noted that "if the covenant be 
within the range of possibility however absurd or improbable the ideas of the execution of it may 
be, it will be upheld." Id. at 502. 
55 This trend was noted by Sir Frederick Pollock in 1911. Pollock noted; 
Indeed many things have become possible which were long supposed to be 
impossible;... Formerly it seemed impossible that we should ever have direct 
evidence of the physical constitution of the sim and fixed stars; we now have as much. 
In the earlier edition of the book the case of an agreement to make a practicable flying 
machine was propounded with some diffidence. Now several persons are ready, and 
publicly offer to sell and warrant such machines. 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 422 (1957). The court in Austin Co. v. United 
States, 314 F.2d 518, 519 (Ct. CI. 1963), also noted this trend; 
[I]n the not too distant past, while perhaps foreseeable, no organization would have 
thought possible or imdertaken a contract to construct a device whereby a living human 
body could be put in orbit around the earth; nevertheless, it has been accomplished. 
Thus, in this case, we cannot categorically say that it was or is impossible to achieve 
the goal called for in the plaintiffs contract. 
2005] R E N D E R E D  I M P R A C T I C A B L E  2191 
common understandings that the implied intent of any commercial 
agreement is that "a thing is said to be impossible when it is not 
practicable, and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an 
excessive or unreasonable cost."^^ Labeled commercial impracticability, 
courts used this subjective view of impossibility in cases involving 
unforeseen costs increases," extreme difficulty," and illegality." 
When attempting to standardize variations in American contract 
law, the drafters of the U.C.C. included commercial impracticability as 
§ 2-615.^'^ The drafters sought to codify "[t]he ever-shifting line, drawn 
56 Devitt V. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.S. 654, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901) (quoting 
Moss V. Smith, 9 C.B. 94, 103 (1850)). 
57 See, e.g.. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916). In Mineral Parkland 
Co., a contractor agreed to remove gravel from landowner's property for the construction job. Id. 
at 290. After removing roughly half the needed gravel, the contractor refused to remove the 
balance. Id. The rest of the gravel sat below water. W. at 291. Technology existed to extract the 
gravel; however, the cost of removal utilizing this technology greatly exceeded the market price 
of gravel. Id. Accordingly, the court excused performance. Id. at 191). 
58 See, e.g., Northem Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974). Here, a 
contractor agreed to repair a l^e dam by quarrying rock. Id. at 77. Due to ice on the lake, stone 
removal became difficult. Id. at 78. Trucks repeatedly fell through the ice. Id. However, the 
contractor continued, until the lake's condition led to the death of two workers. Id. at 79. The 
court discharged the contractor's performance. Id. at 85. 
59 See, e.g., Brauer v. Hyman, 121 A. 667 (N.J. 1923) (discharging a promisor from a contract 
to purchase a liquor store, because of the federally mandated alcohol Prohibition); Directions, Inc. 
V. New Prince Concrete Constr. Co., 491 A.2d 1347 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (stating that 
the regulation or law, foreign or domestic, may be an event the nonoccurrence of which was a 
basic assumption upon which the contract was made); see also Note, The Fetish of Impossibility 
in the Law of Contracts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 99 (1953) (arguing that courts grant the illegality 
excuse to discourage criminal activity, and not because performance is impossible from an 
objective or subjective standpoint). 
60 See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1994), which states: 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the 
preceding section on substituted performance: (a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in 
whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of 
his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made 
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with 
any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it 
later proves to be invalid .... 
Commentators have written extensively on U.C.C § 2-615. Although not exclusive, excellent 
analyses are found in the following: Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability Doctrine of the 
U.C.C., 29 DUQ. L. REV. 221 (1991); George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of 
Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial 
Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203 (1979); Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a 
Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615 from the Common Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 1032 
(1977); Duesenberg, supra note 44; Michael A. Schmidt & Bruce A. Wollschlager, Section 2-615 
"Commercial Impracticability": Making the Impracticable Practicable, 81 COM. L.J. 9 (1976); 
Gerard A. Gilbride, The Uniform Commercial Code: Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOK. 
L. REV. 177(1964). 
Interestingly, uniform international contract law—^under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), to which the United States is a signatory— 
rejects the impracticability doctrine, only allowing an excuse in situations where a party proves 
that failure to perform "was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not 
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by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, 
[under] which the community's interest in having contracts enforced 
according to their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness 
of requiring performance."^^ Section 2-615 and its associated official 
comments require the claiming party to prove that he: did not foresee®^ 
(or cause)63 the event at the time of contracting; did not assume the risk 
of the future event's occurrence;^ and made reasonable attempts to 
assure that the source of the good in question did not fail." 
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into accoimt at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences" United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the Intemational Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 79(1), S. TREATY DOC. No. 
98-9(1986), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3,67. . 
61 Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (1966). This is a 
frequently cited case dealing with the modem impracticability doctrine under § 2-615. A ship 
owner based his claim for recovery on the Suez Canal elosure and the corresponding need to 
undertake a voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. Id. at 314. The court ruled that the risk of 
the Suez Canal closure was allocated to the ship owner. Id. at 318. Therefore, the court barred 
recovery. Mat319-20. 
62 As U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 1 reads: 
This section excuses a seller from the timely delivery of goods contracted for, where 
his performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen 
supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
contracting. 
Since virtually nothing is unforeseeable, in the sense that every event can be assigned a 
mathematical probability, the foreseeability requirement is a "contemplation" doctrine, invoking 
the question; what future events should have been negotiated in the underlying contract and what 
contingencies were not? Joskow, supra note 9, at 157. Courts generally enforce those contracts 
whose interfering future event should have been part of the decisionmaking process. M. 
Professor Famsworth supports this position. See E. Allan Famsworth, supra note 3, at 876-71 
(suggesting that courts should attempt to determine whether the future event was foreseen by the 
parties). If the event was foreseeable, courts should then attempt to determine the parties' actual 
expectations. Courts ascertain the parties' expectations by examining their negotiations, including 
proposals conceming price, and trade usage. Id. 
63 If for example, a shop owner bums downs his store, the owner cannot claim the 
impracticability defense under § 2-615. This requirement derives implicitly frorn § 2-615's 
language and explicitly from case law. See, e.g.. Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983) (barring the seller's use of the impracticability defense where seller 
could not fill as many orders as accepted); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, 
Inc., 600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979) (denying the impracticability defense to a seller who failed to 
respond to the buyer's request to deliver substitute goods after the ongmal goods became 
unavailable). u-i., 
64 Under this prong, U.C.C. § 2-615 departs from the ngid requirements for impracticability, 
responding to the changing nature of eommercial transactions since the nineteenth century. Id. 
However, the requirements for rendering performance impracticable are relatively strict. Id. As 
U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 explains: 
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost due to some 
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither 
is a rise nor a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type 
of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover. 
But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, 
embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources or supply or the 
like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller 
fforti securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of 
this section. 
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Some legal scholars characterize § 2-615 as confusing,which in 
turn might explain the existence of inconsistent case holdings.^^ In an 
attempt to minimize this confusion and provide justification for § 2-615, 
legal economists examined the impracticability doctrine shortly after its 
drafting.^^ Unfortunately, however, these scholars failed to reach a 
uniform conclusion, with their collective analysis dividing into two 
distinct camps best represented by the work of Richard Posner and 
Andrew Rosenfield, and Paul Joskow. The following section will 
discuss some general micro-economic principles, define foreseeability, 
and examine these two approaches. 
II. TRADITIONAL MICRO-ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE 
IMPRACTICABILITY DOCTRINE 
A. Micro-Economics, Contract Law, and Foreseeability 
Law and economics posits that legal rules are best understood in 
light of standard economic principles, most notably efficiency. 
Efficiency asks the following question; to what degree does a given rule 
of law maximize society's wealth?^^ According to law and economics, 
contract law should aim to promote efficiency™ by minimizing the 
Note that this section states that cost alone is not sufficient to render performance irnpracticable. 
To be impracticable, the unforeseen event must have really "hurt." Joskow, iupra note 9, at 160. 
65 Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-615 states: "There is no excuse under this section 
however, unless the seller has employed all due measures to assure himself that his somce will 
not fail." This comment refers to the case Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses 
Co. 179 N.E. 283 (N.Y. 1932). In this case, a buyer sued a seller for failure to deliver molasses. 
Id. at 384-85. The seller claimed that the contract implied delivery only if its exclusive supplier, a 
refinery, produced enough molasses to meet the buyers needs. The refinery cut its produchon and 
could not meet the needs of the seller. Id. The court did not discharge the seller from its 
obligation to the buyer and held that the seller must make all reasonable attempts to avoid the 
failure of the underlying condition. W. , , . .• u r.h 
66 See Sirianni, supra note 5, at 31 (stating generally that the impracticability doctrine 
largely incoherent); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, §3-10 (expressing similar sentiment). 
67 See Wladis, supra note 4, at 600-25. Compare Noonan Constr. Co. v. Warren Bros. Co. 
632 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1980) (excusing manufacmrer's contractual performance after a grave 
machine broke down at the seller's plant), with Cosden Oil & Chem Co. v. Karl O. He m 
Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding seller's obligation to perform even 
though defective machine prevented performance). 
68 See sources cited supra note 9. 
69 For a formalized explanation of efficiency, see THOMAS J. MICEU, ECONOMICS 
LAW 4-7 (1997) Wealth maximization is also known as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, for examp e. 
nif A values the wood carving at $5 and B at $12, so that any prince between $5 and 
$12 the transaction creates a total benefit of $7 (at a price of $10, for examp e, 
considers himself $5 better off and B considers himself $2 better off), then it is an 
efficient transaction provided that the harm (if any) done to third parties (minus any 
benefit to them) does not exceed $7. 
POSNER, supra note 10, at 14. 
70 As Posner and Rosenfield remark: 
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transaction costs^i associated with private exchange.^^ In the context of 
the impracticability doctrine, the doctrine will realize true economic 
efficiency when the rule minimizes the transaction costs associated with 
bargaining. 
As evidenced by the varying interpretations proffered by Posner 
and Rosenfield, and Joskow, questions still remain as to whether the 
current impracticability doctrine maximizes efficiency. To unravel this 
knotty question—since both interpretations (albeit at different levels) 
rely on the concept of foreseeability when attempting to determine the 
efficiency of the impracticability doctrine—foreseeability should be 
defined.'^3 jhis is especially true since Posner and Rosenfield, and 
Joskow failed to explicitly define foreseeability when examining the 
impracticability doctrine. 
To resolve this confusion and to understand the impracticability 
doctrine under the assumptions of law and economics, foreseeability 
should be characterized in reference to transaction costs and efficiency. 
This Note defines foreseeability by the following equation: 
T C , < P , ^ M ,  
where E  represents a given future event, T C E equals the transaction 
costs associated with determining £"s risk and magnitude, PE equals the 
probability of E\ occurrence, and ME equals £"s magnitude. In other 
words, a given risk will be foreseeable if the transaction costs associated 
with determining the risk and magnitude of a given event is less than or 
equal to the product of the event's probability and magnitude.^^ 
Conversely, an event will be unforeseeable if the costs of determining 
the risk's probability and magnitude outweigh the event's potential 
If the purpose of the law of eontracts is to effectuate the desires of the contracting 
parties, then the proper criterion for evaluating the rules of contract law is surely that of 
economic effieieney.... A law of contract not based on efficiency considerations 
will... be largely futile. 
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 89; Bruce, supra note 9, at 321 ( [T]he ovemdmg 
economic function of contract law is the attainment of effieieney in exchange."); Note, supra note 
9, at 1252 ("[A] contract principle is justified whenever its operation produces a more efficient 
distribution of resources. To say that a legal doctrine is economically efficient is to say that the 
doctrine makes society better off"). 
71 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 350 (7th ed. 1999) (defining transaction costs as the costs 
of bargaining or acquiring information"). r 
72 This is an extension of the famous Coase Theorem. See Ronald Coase, The Problem oj 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coase Theorem states that regardless of the initial 
assignment of rights, if transaction costs are low enough, then parties will bargain until they 
exhaust all mutual gains, creating an efficient result. See MICELI, supra note 69, at 9. 
73 i«/ra Part IIl.B-C. , • » 
74 This equation is inspired, in part, by Learned Hand's equation for differentiating negligent 
from non-negligent behavior, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cm 
1947). Learned Hand's equation is B = P x L, where B is the burden of precaution, F is the 
probability of harm caused by precaution, and L is liability. Id. Under the Hand Rule, negligence 
analysis considers whether the burden of an untaken precaution outweighs the probability of 
injury multiplied by the severity of likely damages. Id.-, see MICELI, supra note 69, at 20-23 
(describing in more formal terms the Hand Rule and causation in general). 
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damage.''^ Assuming the traditional micro-economic concept of 
rationality—as will be assumed throughout the rest of the Note, 
light of various behavioral critiques^^—this formula comports with the 
economic goal of efficiency, because a rational party will not decrease 
his wealth by expending money, time, and other associated transaction 
costs in an attempt to determine an unforeseeable future event 
Moreover, this formula helps explain the superior risk bearer test and 
helps illustrate the effect of cognitive biases on the current 
impracticability doctrine. 
B. The Superior Risk Bearer Model 
Under Posner and Rosenfield's proposal,^® the superior risk bearer 
is "the party that is the more efficient bearer of the particular risk m 
question" i.e., the party that could have better prevented and/or insured 
against a given risk.^^ Because contracting parties generally cannot 
prevent future risks, however, the superior risk bearer test requires a 
determination of the lowest cost insurer.^'' 
75 But see John Elofson, Note, The Dilemma of Changed Circur^tances 
Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Rtsk Bearer Tests, 3° COLUM J .L. & SOC 
PROBS 1 32-33 (1996) (describing an alternative formulation for foreseeability). Elofson ar^es 
that foreseeability should be defined in reference to the "expenditure necessaiy to include a 
Otee in te M M 33. This resuU is j.s.iM on tho groun^ thM 
the party claiming impracticability should prove that it was not worth the required negotiati g 
costs to include an exculpatory clause explicitly allocating the risk. Id. 
76 See generally Richard H. Thaler, Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus w 
FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS: HOW DO ECONOMISTS DO ECONOMICS. 227 230-
35 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996) (arguing that micro-economics reliance 
on the rational actor is misplaced). But see Posner, supra note 13 (arguing that even in light of 
behavioral economics, man is still rational); Mitchell, supra note 13 (positing that the rationality 
assumotion should not be removed from law and economics). • , 
77 This is an extension of the concept of man as a rational maxirmzer. Tradhional micro­
economics assumes that an actor consciously or unconsciously maximizes ^ j 
will not take actions that decrease his self interest. See POSNER, supra note 10 at A. But see 
Christine Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 15 (asserting that people exhibit bounded willpower, 
noting that people take actions that conflict with and fail to maximize their long tem interests). 
78 One commentator has compared Posner & Rosenfield's proposal to a phallus . singular 
daunting rigid, and cocksure." See Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibdity Doctrine: A 
Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1035 (19 ). 
79 See Posner & Rosenfield, JMpra note 9, at 90. u , r u i ^ =I,.,..IH 
80 See id. at 91 One commentator on legal liability supports the notion that liability should 
attach to the lowest cost insurer when a risk is not preventable by the p^ies involved. As 
Maurice Finkelstein states: "In all cases of liability without fault it will be noticed upon 
observations that the loss is placed on the shoulders of him who can regulate 
easily insure against it." Maurice Finkelstein, The Functional View of Legal Liability, 34 INT L J. 
ETHICS 243 249-50 (1924) (emphasis added). But see Elofson, supra note 75, at 8 (critiquing the 
superior risk bearer test, because it is "an unreliable guide to contracting parties' intentions ). 
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To determine the lowest eost insurer, risk appraisal costs and other 
transaction costs associated with diversifying risk must be calculated. 
Risk appraisal costs refer to the transaction costs of determining the 
"probability that the risk will materialize" and "the magnitude of the 
loss if [the risk] does materialize.''^^ Transaction costs associated with 
diversifying risk represent the costs of pooling a given risk together 
with other uneertain events.Once determined, the lowest cost insurer 
uses these two values when charging the other party a risk premium for 
bearing the risk in question^^ or determining the appropriate level of 
self-insurance^'* or market insuranee needed. 
On a contractual level, each party involved must first determine the 
foreseeability of an event before it can efficiently exehange risk 
premiums and/or purchase insurance. A party will view an event as 
foreseeable if the party's transaction costs of determining a given risk 
are less than or equal to the product of the risk's probability and 
magnitude.^® If a party views an event as foreseeable, then, according 
to Posner and Rosenfield, the lowest eost insurer will ask for a premium 
from the other party in exchange for bearing the risk in question or will 
purchase the appropriate level of insurance.^^ 
On the judicial level, if a future event renders a contract 
impracticable, and the parties did not contractually allocate the risk due 
to a lack of foreseeability, courts must apply a comparative analysis.*^ 
See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 91. 
82 /rf. at 91-92. 
83 See id at 91. Posner emphasizes that both elements must be known in order for the insurer 
to know how much to ask from the other party to the contract as compensation for bearing the 
risk in question. Id. 
84 Id.-, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (7th ed. 1999) (defining self-insurance as "a plan 
under which a business sets aside money to cover any loss"). 
85 See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance. Self-Insurance, and Self-
Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972) (examining the interplay between the demand for market 
insurance and self insurance); Yang-Ming Chang & Isaac Ehrlich, Insurance. Protection from 
Risk, and Risk Bearing, 18 CANADIAN J. ECON. 574, 574-75 (1985) (citing study finding that 
individuals generally prefer self-insurance to market insurance when given the option). 
86 More formally, if TC^ 
87 However, even if parties are able to calculate risk appraisal costs, they may have a difficult 
time finding insurance. As Pietro Trimarchi notes: 
The principle of insurance ... lies basically in aggregating a number of homogenous 
and uncorrelated risks, that are sufficient for the statistical regularity of events to make 
the overall losses in a given timespan predictable with a reasonable degree of a 
accmacy .... An important requisite for any given risk to be efficiently insurable is, 
therefore, that it can be assessed in terms of statistical fmdings. This however is not 
feasible in the case of such exceptional events as wars, intemational crises, national 
political crises and the like, the occurrence of which is so spasmodic as to defy 
statistical calculation over a reasonable timespan. 
See Trimarchi, supra note 3, at 66-67. Moreover, even if insurance can be procured, the superior 
risk bearer might have a negotiating advantage, giving him the ability to shift the risk to other 
parties. See Bruce, supra note 9, at 318-19. 
88 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 92-94 (describing the comparative analysis 
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Under this approach, a court determines which party possessed the 
lowest risk appraisal costs and transaction costs of diversification. Less 
formally, courts assess which party is the lowest cost insurer by 
considering the following questions: (1) which party had more 
knowledge about the likelihood of the risk's occurrence?; (2) which 
party had more knowledge about the consequences of the risk's 
occurrence?; (3) which party was in the best position to diversify its 
risks.^' Under Posner and Rosenfield's approach, a court does not 
inquire into the ex post foreseeability of a given risk; rather, the court 
focuses on which party possessed more knowledge about the future 
event's occurrence and magnitude and/or was in the best position to 
protect against the risk through diversification.^" In other words, a court 
compares which party had the lower TCE. 
To illustrate, assume two parties X and Y."' X has manufactured 
apparel for twenty-five years, and Y owns and operates a chain of 
nationwide retail stores, which sells X's items alongside those of other 
suppliers. Suppose further that Y has lower risk appraisal costs than X 
at the time of contracting, because Y is better acquainted with the 
likelihood of a factory fire affecting his supply source and can better 
estimate his own losses in case of a fire. After a fire (not of X's doing) 
destroys X's factory and X fails to deliver any goods, Y sues X for 
breach of contract, and X claims impracticability in defense. Under the 
superior risk bearer test, a court would excuse X from contractual 
performance for two reasons. First, Y possessed lower risk appraisal 
costs at the time of contracting. Second, Y has lower transaction costs 
associated with diversifying the fire's risk. Y could have purchased one 
policy to cover all losses attributable to his supplier's factory fires, 
while X would have had to expend substantial resources to investigate 
the likelihood of a fire and purchase a more expensive insurance 
policy.^2 
If, as in the above example, it is possible for the court to determine 
the lowest cost insurer, the court denies the impracticability defense to 
applied to two hypothetical cases). 
89 See Elofson, supra note 75, at 9 (characterizing the superior risk bearer test as a three 
pronged analysis, revolving around the above questions). 
90 Id. 
91 This hypothetical is based in part on what Posner and Rosenfield dub "an easy case for 
discharge," and, also a hypothetical provided in Elofson, supra note 75, at 9. Such a case would 
occur when: 
(1) the promisor asking to he discharged could not reasonably have prevented the event 
rendering his performance imeconomical, and (2) the promisee could have insured 
against the occurrence of the risk at a lower cost than the promisor because the 
promisee: (a) was in a better position to estimate both (i) the probability of the event's 
occurrence and (ii) the magnitude of the loss if it did occur and (b) could have self-
insured, whereas the promisor would have to buy most costly market insurance. 
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 92. 
92 See Elofson, supra note 75, at 9. 
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the party with the lowest total transaction costs.^^ If, in contrast, it is 
impossible for the court to determine the party with the lowest total 
transaction costs surrounding the interfering risk,'^ the court denies the 
impracticability defense to any involved party.^^ Posner and Rosenfield 
justify this second result on the theory of pacta sunt servanda—courts 
should enforce contracts.^^ 
1111 (3 The Foreseeability Test Under U.C.C. § 2-615 
• [111: 
Unlike Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test, the 
impracticability doctrine under § 2-615 explicitly requires a 
determination of foreseeability. Under § 2-615, for a court to excuse a 
performance, a party must not have foreseen a future event's occurrence 
at the time of contracting. As Official Comment 1 states: this section 
excuses a seller. . . where his performance has become commercially 
impracticable because of an unforeseen supervening circumstance not 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. 
Although every risk is foreseeable in the sense that every risk has a 
slight mathematical probability of occurrence, the foreseeability 
doctrine resembles a "contemplation doctrine, forcing the judiciary 
93 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 90-91. Posner and Rosenfield analogize this rule 
to the operations of an insurance company. Just because an insurance company cannot prevent a 
fire does not mean the insurance company does not have to indemnify the insured for the damage 
caused by the fire. Id. at 92. 
94 According to Posner and Rosenfield, a good example of when courts would be unable to 
determine the superior risk bearer is the famous coronation cases, where neither party was in a 
superior position to foresee the illness of the King. Id. at 110. See supra note 45 and 
accompanying text for more information on the coronation cases. 
95 Posner and Rosenfield premise this form of strict liability on the premise that the promisor 
to the contract is generally the superior risk bearer and is usually in a better position to P''®5'ent 
changed circumstances and estimate the probability of its occurrence. Posner & Rosenfie , 
supra note 9, at 110. Some commentators question Posner and Rosenfield's reliance on stnct 
liability as a default rule for the superior risk bearer test. As one commentetor states: 
[T]here are reasons to doubt whether strict liability would be the optimal rule. For one 
thing, some versions of the impossibility defense has been accepted by western courts, 
with infi-equent interruptions since at least Roman Times. While not dispositive, this 
fact suggests that strict liability, despite its appealing simplicity, violates some deep-
seated intuition about the significance of changed circumstanees on the contracting 
ElofsorZra note 75, at 28; also Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Dair, Understanding 
Commercial Impracticability, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 347 (1996) ("[T]he strict liability of contract 
historically has been tempered by some sense of fairness or justice."). 
96 See supra note 26-27. 
97 U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (1994). 
98 Id. The impracticability doctrine under the U.C.C. is a contemplation doctnne, because it 
no event is unforeseeable because there is a mathematical probability of occurrence, the doctrine 
will never be applied and contracting parties will be left with a de facto strict liability rule as the 
default rule. 
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ex post to make a determination of the future occurrences parties should 
have reasonably included in their contract negotiations.^^ 
Joskow contends that micro-economic theory supports § 2-615. 
The rigid foreseeability test of § 2-615 strikes a balance between the 
policy of pacta sunt servanda and a lenient interpretation of 
impracticability.^"" Strict enforcement of the impracticability doctrine 
places the burden of future risks on the promisor, creating an incentive 
for the parties to write detailed, complicated contracts that increase 
negotiation costs.Increased negotiating costs, in turn, provide a 
disincentive for parties to enter into contracts, limiting the ability of 
parties to diversify risks and generate wealth. Conversely, a lenient 
interpretation of the impracticability doctrine negates the important risk-
diversifying function of fixed contracts by creating a disincentive to 
provide for future risks.Joskow argues that the foreseeability test lies 
in the middle. The doctrine creates an incentive for parties to articulate 
reasonably contemplated future occurrences,'"^ which encourages 
parties to carefully evaluate available information and allocate the risk 
of foreseeable events in their contracts.'"'' Doing this, Joskow contends, 
increases efficiency'"^ by reducing the transaction costs associated with 
bargaining.'"" 
99 To illustrate, if parties live in the San Francisco Bay area and enter into a long term 
construction contract there for twenty years, it might be unreasonable for the parties to allocate 
the risk of a debilitating blizzard. However, it would be reasonable for the parties to take into 
account the possibility of an earthquake or national war. 
100 According to Joskow, § 2-615 sets a "strict standard that contracts will be performed unless 
certain low-probability events occur." Joskow, supra note 9, at 163. Moreover, the test does not 
"reward suppliers who ... do not behave efficiently." Id. 
101 Rigid enforcement of contracts provides an incentive for parties to articulate every future 
occurrence. This leads to over-contracting and waste. See id. at 154; Pierpaolo Battigalli & 
Giovanni Maggi, Imperfect Contracting, Working Paper Feb. 2000, available at 
http://www.prineeton.edu/~maggi/eontrwp3.pdf (stating that contracts are often incomplete 
because it is too costly to describe all relevant contingencies and behavior of contracting parties). 
192 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 153-54. A lenient interpretation of the impracticability 
doctrine places the risk of future events on the promisee. Therefore, the promisee would have to 
find ways to self-insure or also specify all contingencies under which the promisee expects 
performance under the contract. Id. 
193 Id. at 163. See supra notes 62, 64, 98 for a discussion of § 2-615's use of foreseeability as 
a contemplation doctrine. 
194 Joskow, supra note 9 at 163; see also Elofson, supra note 75, at 35 (stating that the 
foreseeability doctrine also reduces the incentive for parties to over-contract). Since the 
impossibility defense is only available if the future event could not have been reasonably 
accounted for in the contraet, a promisor is eneouraged to allocate risks contractually. However, 
parties are not encouraged to bargain for exhaustive exeulpatory clauses, because the 
impossibility defense is available as a means of reading appropriate clauses into the contract 
should extremely remote risks occur. Id. at 35-36. Therefore, the foreseeability test encourages 
efficient negotiation. Id. at 36. 
195 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reduction of 
transaction costs as the paradigm under which law and economics views legal rules. 
196 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 163 ("U.C.C. § 2-615 as now interpreted does appear to 
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Interestingly, Joskow also raises, as an aside, that foreseeability 
may only be understood in conjunction with bounded rationality.'"^ 
Bounded rationality acknowledges that people lack infinite cognitive 
abilities and fail to assimilate and order infinite amounts of 
information.'"^ This inability may explain why people lack the ability 
to determine the probability and magnitude of every future risk.'"" 
Under the above definition of foreseeability, cognitive limitations make 
the transaction costs of determining every risk's probability and 
magnitude economically prohibitive. The transaction costs of 
determining a future event's probability and magnitude may at times 
outweigh the potential damage caused by the event,"" making most 
events appear subjectively unforeseeable at any given moment. 
While a relatively new concept at the time Joskow penned his 
article, bounded rationality now rests as a primary theory of behavioral 
economics, helping to explain how people make decisions.'" The 
following section outlines those precepts of behavioral economics that 
are pertinent for the rest of the Note and examines their effect on 
foreseeability under § 2-615 and the superior risk bearer test. 
III. IMPRACTICABILITY, FORESEEABILITY, AND BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 
A. Behavioral Economics 
Behavioral law and economics explores the implications of actual 
human behavior on the law,"^ stressing the existence of an important 
promote voluntary exchange by reducing transaction costs and providing guidance and 
encouragement for efficient use of information about alternative future states of the world in 
contract negotiations . ..."). 
107 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 157 ("The foreseeability requirement may only make sense if 
we introduce the concept of 'bounded rationality.'"). 
108 See supra note 14; see also infra text accompanying notes 118-25 (discussing of bounded 
rationality and its effect on subjective probability assessments). 
109 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 157 (stating that "bounded rationality recognizes that human 
beings cannot evaluate all possible states of the world or all available information that might 
affect a particular situation"). 
110 Micro-economics represent the concept of cognitive limitations by defining them as 
"positive information costs." Such costs are divided into two categories: the costs of acquiring 
information, and the costs of absorbing or processing information. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 
17. 
111 See supra notes 14, 18 and in/ra notes 118-25. 
112 See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., supra note 13, at 1476 (asserting that the purpose of 
behavioral law and economics is to understand how acmal human behavior effects legal rules); 
Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 
1750 (1998) (stating that the purpose of behavioral law and economies is to refine traditional 
micro-economic approaches to legal doctrine, by identifying "cognitive limitations" or 
"information processing problems"). 
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bound on human decision-making; bounded rationality.''^ Thi^s 
cognitive limitation helps explain how people use information to predict 
Ze events, focusing on people's limited abili^ to iather and proee^ 
information, their use of mental shorteuts to help them do so, and their 
cognitive biases in making decisions."" The presence of these fae ors 
exSains why people fail to make consistent rational deeisions that 
LSform to Lalth-maximizing goals.'" Moreover, these lm..tat,ons 
may also bring into question traditional miero-economic assumptions of 
Sdity, ulility maximization, stable preferences, and optimal 
''™To™d:^"S 'r-gntaes that human cognitive faenlt^s 
cannot evaluate all possible states of the world ^ ^ 
information that might affect a particular situation^"^ People are 
endowed with inadequate computational skills, flawed memones, 
limited amounts of time."® However, even with these constraints, 
people must still make decisions by collecting and processmg 
information The manner of acquiring and processmg information is 
costra^it consumes time, energy, and often money.'- Peop ^ te^ 
"economize to some degree on information," minimizing the ^^1 cos 
of decision-making, including the cost of error.'" People adapt to 
113 Although heyond the scope of this Note, two other limitations might affect hurnM decision 
PSYCHOL MV 371 (1988); let alio Eoben E. Scoti, Error ««( SaimljV " 
iltai tot=m.l p~,, 09.1.; limll.tion., .he w.y in wbich ihe process of Bdi.idrf 
""iscrUnp « hcnrisEc - b« 
beings are not particularly good at thinking rationally. ). 
In 2rjXrt?t«jrnotTi?at H?? (-[Hluman cognitive abilities are not infinite^ We 
have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memones."); Joskow, supra note 9, 
(expressing similar sentiment). 
In SuitltTc:;: that -m order to make decisions, people must 
collect and process information ) ,2,4 p.ijj reality ... searching for and processing 
:HH~=£-=S==~— 
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limited memory capacity by making lists, and counteract their limited 
brain power by using mental shortcuts and rules of thumb.^22 These 
shortcuts inform appropriate decisions, given the information available 
and the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker. 122 However, 
because these decisions rest on shortcuts, they potentially lead to 
inaccurate decisions about a future event's probability.'24 
Heuristics refer to the mental lists and shortcuts people use to cope 
with their bounded rationality.'25 Humans use heuristics during the 
decision-making process to make quick and low-cost inferences, usually 
in uncertain decision-making environments.'26 Because people possess 
limited cognitive abilities, these heuristics "reduce the complex task of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations."'22 Humans use heuristics in lieu of using analytical 
methods or deliberate calculations,'28 processing information by 
drawing on their memories and experiences.'29 Generally, people do 
not attempt to determine the objective probability of an event's 
oceurrence.'^® Instead, people use heuristics to construct subjective 
probability assessments, which include computations of previously 
experienced events.'^' People mistakenly believe that easily "available" 
et al., supra note 13, at 1477 (stating that people sometimes respond rationally to their own 
cognitive limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs). 
122 jolls et al., supra note 13, at 1477. 
123 These decisions are reached on less than perfect information, typically using a "grab bag of 
shortcuts" that have proved satisfactory over time in producing results. See Garvin, supra note 
13, at 392; Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and 
Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 142 n.327 (1998) (stating that limits on mental processing 
and availability of data lead to the best decision possible). 
124 If the costs of acquiring and processing information were zero, and human cognitive 
abilities were perfect, then an individual would comprehensively search for information, process 
perfectly all the information acquired, and then make the best possible decision. This decision 
would be better than all the alternative decisions the individuals might have made. Therefore, this 
decision would maximize the actor's subjective expected utility. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 
214. 
125 Heuristics can be conceptualized as rules of thumb that lead people to conclusions "quickly 
and cheaply." See Garvin, supra note 132, at 146; Cass R. Sunstein, The Perception of Risk, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1125 n.24 (2002) (book review) (providing this useful definition of 
heuristics: "Heuristics are rules of thumb, substituting simple questions for a more difficult one"). 
126 See Jane Cioffi, Heuristics, Servants to Intuition, in Clinical Decision-making, 26 J. 
ADVANCED NURSING 203, 205 (1997) (discussing how clinical nurses must use heuristics to 
make decisions in uncertain environments). 
127 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 3. 
128 See Cioffi, supra note 126, at 205-06 (describing smdies finding that heuristics are used in 
lieu of objective calculations of surrounding events). 
129 See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 220 ("When an actor makes a decision that requires a 
judgment about the probability of an event, he commonly judges that probability on the basis of 
comparable data and scenarios that are readily available to his memory or imagination."); Cioffi, 
supra note 126, at 205 (acknowledging that heuristics are made in reference to previous events, 
causality, exemplars, and availability). 
130 See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 221 (asserting that heuristics lead to systematic biases 
because factors other than objective probability and frequency affect how people make decisions). 
131 See Cioffi, supra note 126, at 205. Individuals process information of a subjective nature 
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events—those easy to recall—will more likely occur than events more 
difficult to remember.The use of availability heuristics leads to 
decisional error when assessing risk, because vivid memories of recent 
events are recalled with more ease than commonplace ones.'^s por 
example, people tend to overestimate the possibility of contracting 
specific diseases if family members or close friends suffer from them. 
While people find availability heuristics helpful when making 
decisions,i35 they may lead to inaccurate subjective probability 
assessments.'^^ 
Beyond heuristics, humans also exhibit cognitive biases that 
further shape an individual's subjective probability assessment for a 
given future event. Three such cognitive biases are over-optimism, the 
confirmation bias, and the hindsight bias. People generally exhibit 
over-optimism and overconfidence.'^^ This shapes peoples decision­
making ability, causing them to systematically underestimate the 
probability of future events.People in most social categories believe 
to estimate probability from personal experiences in judgment situations. Id. at 206. The 
estimations occur rapidly, and some psychologists believe that they give judgments based on 
"odds." Such odds are made imconsciously by people when placed in a decisionmaking situation 
where the answer is not certain or there are multiple answers to a single problem. M. 
132 As Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler state: "[T]he frequency of some event is estimated by 
judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type (how 'available' such instances 
are). ..." Jolls et ah, supra note 13, at 1477. For a simple example of the error involved when 
relying on availability heuristics see Garvin, supra note 123, at 147. Ask yourself whether there 
are more words that start with the letter "K" or have "K" in the third position. If you chose the 
former, then you would be incorrect. Twice as many words have the letter "K" in the third 
position rather than in the first. Most people err here, because it is easier to remember words that 
begin with the letter "K" than words that have "K" in the third position. Id. 
133 See. e.g., Garvin, supra note 123, at 146-47 ("[Vjivid memories may color our 
recollections too garishly, distorting our perceptions and. . . our analyses .... [T]he dominant 
datum overwhelms its recessive mate."); Garvin, supra note 13, at 406 (stating that people tend 
to overvalue their own experience in assessing risk"); Jolls et ah, supra note 13, at 1477 ("People 
tend to conclude .. . that the probability of an event... is greater if they have recently witnessed 
an occurrence of that event than if they have not. ). 
134 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 707 (1999) ("While underestimating dangers that are not highly publicized 
(heart disease, strokes, asthma^ [people] grossly overestimate risks to which the media pay a 
great deal of attention (accidents, electrocution)."); Garvin, supra note 123, at 147 (asserting that 
people, especially those with personal experience with natural disasters, tend to overestimate the 
risk of tornadoes and floods); Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 221 (noting that events that are 
"instantiated, vivid, and concrete" will be more "salient" than scenarios which are "general, 
pallid, and abstract"). 
135 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 3. ^ 
136 See id. at 20 (explaining that people do not make objective assessments of an event s 
probability or frequency); Eisenberg, si/pra note 13, at 220-21. 
137 See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 
(1997) (stating that even factually informed people think that risks are less likely to materialize 
for themselves than for others); Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic 
Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1773 (1998) (observing that people are over-optimistic 
about their fate even when they know the magnitude of the risk to the general public). 
138 See Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183 ("People systemically underestimate the extent to 
which they are at risk .. . ."); Arlen, supra note 137, at 1773 (noting that experimental evidence 
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that adverse events will not affect them,'^^ especially in situations where 
they possesses the ability to minimize the risk through their own 
behavior. 140 For example, roughly ninety percent of motorists believe 
they are above-average drivers.i^i Recent college graduates exhibit 
over-optimism about the probability of owning their own homes, 
enjoying their jobs, avoiding drinking problems, and remaining 
married. 142 Most decision-makers, moreover, are susceptible to the 
over-optimism bias. It applies to professionals and merchants who— 
even in the face of the economy's cyclical booms and depressions143— 
consistently exhibit over-optimism about expected production. 144 
Interestingly, the only group found not to exhibit such over-optimism is 
the clinically depressed. i43 
The confirmation bias also leads to a subjective undervaluation or 
overvaluation of risk, by inducing people to confirm prior decisions 
regardless of whether the decisions were correct when made.i46 Once 
people form an initial opinion on a given subject, they tend to disregard 
new information that contradicts their initial opinion.i42 For example, if 
and empirical analysis demonstrate that "people make consistent and systematic errors m nsk 
assessment") 
139 See Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183. For example, homosexual men appear to 
underestimate the risk that they will get AIDS even if they possess a sufficient amount of 
information about the disease in general. Id. 
140 See Arlen, supra note 137, at 1773 (asserting that when people can control the nsk and 
magnitude of an event they are particularly susceptible to over-optimism, because people tend to 
over-estimate their own capabilities). 
141 See Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers Are?, 
47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981) (describing in detail a psychological experiment which 
supported this conclusion). 
142 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY 
& See. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 (1980). 
143 See generally CHARLES KINDELBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES (1978) 
(discussing the rise and fall of the American economy, throughout U.S. history). 
144 See Jakob Brochner Madsen, Tests of Rationality Versus an "Over Optimist" Bias, 15 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 587 (1994). 
145 See Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn Y. Abramson, Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and 
Nondepressed Students: Sadder but Wiser?, 108 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 441 (1979); 
Benjamin M. Dykman et al.. Effects of Ascending and Descending Patterns of Success Upon 
Dysphoric and Nondysphoric Subjects' Encoding, Recall, and Predictions of Future Success, 15 
COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 179 (1991). 
Ironically, because lawyers as a group experience higher than average levels of depression, 
lawyers may as a profession minimize the over-optimism bias. See Martin E.P. Seligman et al.. 
Why Lawyers are Unhappy?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33 (2001). 
146 See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al.. Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects 
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
2098 (1979) (discussing in detail the confirmation bias); Nickerson, supra note 18, at 175 
(declaring that the "[cjonfirmation bias is perhaps the best known and most widely accepted 
notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning ). 
147 This is especially true for people who use weak evidence to form an initial opinion. See 
Mathew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 26 (1998) (discussing and 
providing examples of the confirmation bias). The confirmation bias is a long recognized 
phenomenon. Francis Bacon recognized this distortion on human reasoning in 1620: 
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the 
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a teacher initially believes that one student is smarter than another, the 
teacher will likely confirm that initial opinion when interpreting later 
performance even when the student's performance is sub-par.in the 
context of predicting future risks, once an individual forms an initial 
opinion about a given risk, he might not revise this opinion when 
subsequently presented with more accurate information. 
An additional cognitive bias is the hindsight bias, which refers to 
the tendency to exaggerate in hindsight what one knew in foresight.'^" 
In other words, the hindsight bias is "a person's tendency to judge past 
decisions in light of one's current knowledge of the outcome," 
distorting "one's ability to judge the true probability of a particular 
outcome."'^^ This bias shows few individual or cultural limits 
influencing people throughout the world. xhe bias, moreover, 
impacts economic expectations, suggesting that the hindsight bias may 
affect businesses professionals. For example, in one study, participants 
rated the probabilities of various economic developments happening 
after the Euro's introduction. One year later, the participants were 
received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all other things else to support 
and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be 
found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some 
distinction sets aside and rejects .... And such is the way of all superstitions whether 
in astrology, dreams, omens, divine judgments, or the like; wherein men, having a 
delight in such vanities, mark the events where they are fulfilled, but when they fail, 
although this happened much oftener, neglect and pass them buy. 
Francis Bacon, Novum organum, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 36 
(Burt E.A. ed., 1939). 
Another example includes a study where imdergraduates were asked to complete a 
questioimaire on capital punishment. Id. at 27. After all the students finished the questiormaire, a 
sample of proponents and opponents of capital punishment were selected from the initial group. 
These subjects were then given randomly selected studies (and criticisms of each study), and 
asked to judge the merits of the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. The results indicated that, 
on average, those who were proponents before being given the additional material believed more 
in the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty after reading the material, while those who were 
initially opposed to the death penalty believed even less in the deterrent efficacy. Id. 
149 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 142 (2003) ("Once a person 
voluntarily commits to an idea or course of action, there is a strong motivation to resist evidence 
that it was ill-chosen."). 
150 See Rudiger Pohl et al.. Hindsight Bias Around the World, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
270, 272 (2002) (stating that the hindsight bias is very robust, and has been demonstrated in 
numerous studies over a period of more than twenty-five years). 
151 Debra L. Worthington et al.. Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone Breast Implant 
Litigation: Making the Case for Court-Appointed Experts in Complex Medical and Scientific 
Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PtnB. POL'Y. & L. 154, 155 (2002). The cognitive strategy of "creeping 
determinism" explains the hindsight bias. This is the tendency of people to automatically 
incorporate an outcome into their understanding of pre-existing circumstemces. For example, 
"when people leam of an outcome, they integrate that knowledge into the story they" construct to 
explain a given event. Thus, people "rewrite" events so that the begiiming, middle, and end are 
causally connected. While rewriting, people "favor facts that are consistent with the outcome 
over facts that are not." Id. at 155-56. 
152 Pohl, supra note 151, at 271-72. 
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reminded of the Euro's introduction and told about the economic 
changes that occurred over the past year. Many of the study s 
participants, armed with new information about the changes over the 
past year, revised their initial probability assessments to better reflect 
reality. 1" Given that courts judge in hindsight, this bias may also exert 
a tremendous influence on judicial decision-making, especially when a 
court must determine what a party '"knew or should have known. 
Together, bounded rationality, availabiUty heuristics, over-
optimism, the confirmation bias, and the hindsight bias provoke 
questions concerning the ability of humans to accurately assess a given 
risk, thereby clouding reliance on rules that require ex post 
determinations of an event's foreseeability. Accordingly, as the 
following examples will illustrate, these heuristics and cognitive biases 
undermine reliance on a foreseeability standard, an insight damaging to 
§2-615.  
B. The Effect of Heuristics and Cognitive Biases on Subjective 
Assessments of Foreseeability 
Heuristics and cognitive biases are significantly implicated ^en 
an individual must determine the foreseeability of a future event. When 
determining the risk and magnitude of a future event, a party will re y 
on heuristics to make subjective probability assessments, which are 
influenced by cognitive biases.'^s People use such subjective 
probability assessments in situations lacking immediate answers, or 
where all possible answers cannot be determined. ^ 56 Heuristics and 
cognitive biases affect a party's determination of an event's probability. 
153 Erik Holzl et al., Hindsight Bias in Economic Expectations: I Knew All Along What I Want 
o Hear, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 437, 440-42 (2002). This also suggests that businesses 
irofessionals may also be susceptible to the hindsight bias. . . , • . u-
154 Rachlinski, supra note 17, at 591. Juries have been shown to 
leelieence cases See e g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES; HOW JURIES DECIDE 
•2002); NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME; HOW JURIES THINK AND TALK ^BOUT ACCM 
7000 • Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Bustness Judgment Rule^ 
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994); KIM F ' 
Rachlinski, Ex-Post Not = Ex Ante: Determining Liability 'nHinchight ^ 
(1995) For example, in one study, participants were asked to judge in foresight whether 
municipality should take a precaution against flooding or to judge in hindsight whether ^ decision 
not to take the same precaution was negligent after lack of planning caused one million of 
dlage The two conditions produced different results. In foresight, only 24 percent of the 
participants decided that the municipality should take precautions, while in hindsight 57 percem 
found the decision not to take precautions negligent. See Rachlinski supra note 17 at 589 ^ 
However, it is important to note that none of these studies polled actual junes; rather these studies 
occurred in controlled conditions, with authors then making inferences from their results. UCUllCU lU C-UllllVlIVA* 
155 See supra Part IV. A and accompanying notes. 
156 See Cioffi, supra note 126, at 205 
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or PE in the above definition of foreseeability. The degree to which 
heuristics and cognitive biases affect this variable will determine the 
foreseeability of a future event. 
Decision-makers assessing probability during contract negotiations 
will rely on their previous experiences.The availability of these 
experiences shapes a party's assessment of a future event's probability 
and magnitude. 158 To illustrate, again assume two parties X and Y. X 
has manufactured apparel for twenty-five years, and Y owns and 
operates a chain of nationwide retail stores which sells these items. In 
all of his years in operation, X has never heard or learned of a fire 
affecting his or his competitors' factories, all of which employ similar 
manufacturing equipment as X. Suppose further that X can quantify 
transaction costs determining the probability and magnitude of a future 
fire, TCE, the probability of the future fire, PE, and the magnitude of the 
fire's damage. ME. The transaction costs of determining the probability 
and magnitude of the future fire equal $10,000 and the product of the 
objective probability and magnitude equals $11,000, meaning that X 
should objectively foresee this event. The two parties, moreover, agree 
to allocate the risk of all foreseeable events. During contract 
negotiations, X will likely make a subjective probability assessment of 
the likelihood of his plant's destruction. X's lack of memories 
associated with fires afflicting his and his competitors' factories will 
influence this probability assessment, making it likely that X will 
underestimate the fire's probability and subjectively fail to foresee an 
objectively foreseeable event. In other words, X will likely 
underestimate PE, concluding that the product of the fire's probability 
and magnitude are less than the transaction costs of determining the 
probability and magnitude of the fire. X will, therefore, fail to allocate 
the risk of the fire contractually or through the purchase of insurance. 
The confirmation bias also limits people's ability to determine an 
event's foreseeability'by inducing people to confirm prior decisions 
157 See Paul B. Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages Clause: A Practical 
Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 64 (2001) (stating that the 
"phenomenon of availability has significant implications for contract formation"); see also Cioffi, 
supra note 126, at 205. 
158 See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 13, at 12 (discussing assessment of risk in the investor 
context, and stating that "[i]nvestors may under[-]weigh low probability, high magnitude risks if 
no obvious examples of the risk have recently been brought to their attention"). Choi and 
Pritchard provide a helpful real-world example: 
Immediately after the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the United States, the net 
volume of money flowing into mutual funds actually turned negative for a period of 
time, even though the holders of diversified mutual funds are unlikely to suffer any 
significant reduction in their returns from fraud at any particular company. 
Id. 
159 The confirmation bias leads people to a systematic underestimation of risk, which in turn 
will cause a distortion in the foreseeability equation. People attempt to reduce cognitive 
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regardless of whether the decisions were correct when made.^^'' In the 
context of risk appraisal, if a decision-maker forms an initial opinion 
that he is shielded from a given risk, he will likely maintain this opinion 
throughout negotiations even when presented with more accurate 
information. This, in turn, will cause an underestimation of a given 
risk.i^' Conversely, if the decision-maker forms an opinion that he is 
susceptible to a given risk, this opinion will carry through negotiations, 
leading to an overestimation of a given risk. For example, assume the 
same situation described above involving X and Y with the following 
additional fact: X believes that there is no chance of a fire destroying his 
factory because of a satisfactory inspection by the local fire inspector. 
In other words, X subjectively believes that the product of the risk's 
probability and magnitude approaches zero. Even if X leams about a 
rash of fires affecting his similarly situated competitors, his initial 
opinion might not change to reflect the new information. He might, for 
•i instance, attribute his competitor's fires to eonditions, which, in this 
' case, the fire inspector checked. Because X believes the probability of 
fire to be close to zero, any costs associated with determining the risk 
and magnitude of fire become economically unreasonable, making the 
fire seem subjectively unforeseeable. Accordingly, the confirmation 
bias, in this situation, will prevent X from bargaining over and 
allocating an objectively foreseeable risk either contractually or through 
insurance. 
The over-optimism bias, which indicates that people underestimate 
the probability of adverse events affecting them, also affects the 
foreseeability of future events.Over-optimism is most pronounced 
for difficult tasks, where the individual feels that he possesses a degree 
of control over the risk.'®^ Over-optimism indicates that people will 
dissonance by thinking that the risks they face are lower than they are in fact. As Cass Sunstein 
states, this is a "serious problem for law and policy, and a serious problem too for those who 
accept the rational actor model in the social sciences." Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 772-73 (2003). For more information on cognitive dissonance, see LEON 
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
160 As generally stated in notes 156-60 supra, the confirmation bias is "the tendency to 
interpret ambiguous information in ways that confirm preconceived notions." Russell B. 
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vi. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 
23,46 n.57 (2000). 
161 See Marrow, supra note 157, at 65 ("If a decision maker previously developed the opinion 
that a specific type of loss cannot happen to him, that opinion is likely to be carried forward and 
applied to new risks without serious statistical evaluation being made of the new risk."). 
162 Sgg NEIL D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCI. 1232, 1232 
(1989) ("Optimistic biases in personal risk perceptions are important because they may seriously 
hinder efforts to promote risk-reducing behaviors."). This has serious implications for the 
foreseeability test under § 2-615, because if over-confidence hinders risk-reducing behavior, then 
parties might not contractually allocate future risks. 
163 The reason for this is that people tend to over-estimate their own capabilities. See Arlen, 
supra note 137, at 1773. For example, in a study involving a random sample of New Jersey 
adults, a signifieant over-optimism bias was found for twenty-five of thirty-two hazards, 
I 
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underestimate the risk of adverse future events when making subjective 
probability assessments.Again, assume X, Y, and the same basic 
fact pattern described above. X's transaction costs of determining the 
probability and magnitude of a future fire equal $10,000, while the 
product of the objective probability and magnitude equals $11,000. 
After a recent rash of fires affected bis competitors' factories, X now 
believes that there is a possibility that a fire might destroy bis factory. 
Even though X acknowledges that a fire could affect bis factory, the 
over-optimism bias suggests that X will underestimate the objective 
probability that a fire will affect him. Although the fire is objectively 
foreseeable, when making a subjective probability assessment, X might 
underestimate the probability of the fire's occurrence, FE- If X 
determines the risk of fire to be less than it objectively is due to a 
satisfactory fire inspection, be will subjectively determine that the fire is 
unforeseeable. Thus, although an event in reality might be objectively 
foreseeable, subjective distortions caused by the over-optimism bias 
will cloud the ability of X to plan for fiature events. 
As the above examples demonstrate, heuristics and cognitive 
biases distort individuals' subjective probability assessments. These 
distortions will systematically affect whether or not an individual 
consistently deems a given risk foreseeable.Since under § 2-615 
courts deny the impracticability defense to parties who incorrectly 
determine an event's foreseeability,'^^ the affect of cognitive distortions 
on subjective probability assessments may explain why parties fail to 
contract for future risks while at the same time drawing into question 
whether the impracticability doctrine should rely on a foreseeability 
standard. Behavioral insights, moreover, call into question the 
purported efficiency gains of Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk 
bearer test on a contractual level. If parties fail to determine the 
foreseeability of a future risk, they will not efficiently exchange risk 
including drug addiction, lung cancer, and food poisoning. See Weinstein, supra note 142, at 
1232. In the context of current impracticability doctrine, this could lead to underestimation of 
risk in which the promisor ean eontrol, sueh as maehine malfunctions, supply problems, and 
destmction of manufacturing facilities. 
164 See Arlen, supra note 137, at 1773 (stating that "[e]vidence suggests that people are 
partieularly likely to underestimate the extent to which they themselves are at risk"). 
165 See Scott, supra note 114, at 335 (stating that heuristies cause systematic errors in 
cognitive judgment); Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183 (noting that over-eonfidenee 
systematically causes an underestimation of risk); Nickerson, supra note 18, at 177 (asserting that 
a great deal of evidence supports the idea that the confirmation bias is extensive). 
166 See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (1994). 
167 Norman Praee argues that: "[T]he element of foreseeability has ... in effect, emasculated 
the statute. The effeet has been to deny relief to most parties seeking it and to leave the ease law 
in a state of disorder; the only consistency in options is that the [promisor] almost always loses." 
Norman R. Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 2-
615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 IND. L. REV. 457,485 (1986). 
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premiums and/or purchase insurance.These behavioral insights thus 
question the workability of current impracticability rules that rely on a 
standard of foreseeability. 169 
C. The Effect of Heuristics and Cognitive Biases on Posner and 
Rosenfield's Comparative Superior Risk Bearer Test 
Although behavioral phenomena draw into question the 
foreseeability standard, heuristics and cognitive biases will not distort 
the comparative determination of the lowest cost insurer. Under the 
superior risk bearer test, if parties do not contractually allocate a risk 
and an event allegedly renders performance impracticable, a court does 
not inquire into the event's foreseeability; rather the court makes a 
comparative analysis.'™ Under this approach, a court determines which 
party possessed the lowest risk appraisal costs and transaction costs of 
diversification.Formally, the foreseeability test under § 2-615 
requires the court to determine ejc post whether <P xM 
Conversely, the superior risk bearer test forces a court to make only^a 
comparative ex post determination of TCE plus any additional 
transaction costs associated with risk diversification. 
For example, again, assume X and Y and the same general facts of 
the hypothetical described above. X and Y did not contractually 
provide for the risk of fire. After a fire destroys X's factory, Y sues X 
for breach of contract, and X claims impracticability in defense. In this 
hypothetical, since X is not Y's exclusive supplier, Y is in a better 
position to diversify the risk by purchasing one insurance policy to 
protect against the risk of fire for any of his suppliers' factories. As 
such, assume the risk appraisal costs equal $20,000 for X and $10 000 
for Y. Unlike the foreseeability test under Posner and Rosenfield's 
comparative analysis, a court will only examine the risk appraisal costs 
'68 See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. 
'69 Vmous decisions also provide a basis for questioning the effectiveness of the 
toreseeabihty doctrine, because most courts find that most events are foreseeable. See es Neal-
Cooper Gram Co. v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding government 
excuse); United States v. Wegmatic Corp., 360 F.2d 
674 (2d Cir. 1966) (ruling that engineering problems sufficiently foreseeable in construction of an 
innovative computer system so as deny defense); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v Gulf Oil Com 415 
RS„pp 42, (S.D. Fl.. 1975) ,h.. fUe, en.l, ™. 
impracticability defense), Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N E 2d 363 
(Mass. 1974) (stating that labor strike foreseeable so as to preclude the impracticability defense)-
Maple Fams, Inc. v. City Sch. Dist. Of City of Elmira, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 19741 
(denying the impracticability defense to a supplier of milk where there was a significant change in 
price because the fluctuations in price were foreseeable). 
™ See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
^^1 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
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and other transaction costs associated with the fire. The court would 
deem Y the superior risk bearer regardless of the event's foreseeability, 
because Y could have insured at a lower cost at the time of contracting. 
Accordingly, the court will grant X the impracticability defense and 
discharge his contractual obligations. 
By avoiding the concept of foreseeability, Posner and Rosenfield's 
comparative analysis circumvents distortions to probability assessments 
caused by cognitive biases and heuristics. Determining the lowest cost 
insurer forces the court to identify which party could have insured 
against the outcome at the lowest cost,'^^ and denies the impracticability 
defense to the lowest cost insurer.jf court cannot determine the 
lowest cost insurer, then the court does not discharge contractual 
obligations, a result supported by the principle pacta sunt servanda™ 
D. The Effect of the Hindsight Bias on Judicial Determinations of 
Foreseeability Under U.C.C. § 2-615 and the Superior Risk Bearer Test 
Cognitive biases affect more than just subjective probability 
assessments. They also affect courts' ability to determine an event's 
objective probability in hindsight. The hindsight bias refers to the 
tendency to judge past decisions in light of one's current knowledge of 
the outcome.'''^ When courts make ex post decisions about ex ante 
probability assessments, they are particularly susceptible to the 
hindsight bias.'^^ 
•72 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
'73 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
•74 However, even Posner and Rosenfield question the reliance on strict liability to back up the 
superior risk bearer test. As they acknowledge, "in many individual, and perhaps some classes 
of, cases economic analysis ... will fail to yield a definite answer, or even a guess as to which 
party is the superior risk bearer." Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 110. However, as in tort 
law, when given the choice between strict liability and no liability for unavoidable answers, strict 
liability might be the sensible result, absent any empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. Id. 
•75 See Worthington et al., supra note 151, at 155. 
•76 See Rachlinski, supra note 17, at 590. Rachlinski states that there are three situations 
where coints must make ex pojt judgments of ex ante decisions: 
(1) judgments under objective ("should have known") standards; (2) judgments under 
subjective ("did know") standards; and (3) judgments of what was foreseeable. The 
hindsight bias probably influences all three of these, albeit in slightly different ways. 
Courts also make many judgments in hindsight that do not require an evaluation of ex 
ante decisions and are therefore not subject to the influence of the hindsight bias. 
Id. The hindsight bias has implications across the whole legal system. Consider, for example, the 
dilemma of a defendant who, despite taking reasonable care, has caused an accident and has been 
sued. The defendant's level of care will be reviewed by a judge or jury who already knows that it 
proved inadequate to avoid the plaintiffs injury. Consequently, the defendant's level of care will 
seem less reasonable in hindsight than it did in foresight. Id. 
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Under § 2-615, a court makes an ex post determination of the 
interfering event's foreseeability at the time of contracting, i" Formally, 
a court evaluates ex post whether TCj, <P^xMi,. To illustrate,' 
assume the same basic fact pattern described above involving X and Y. 
Now, suppose that X's transaction costs of determining the probability 
and magnitude of a future fire equals $12,000, while the product of the 
objective probability and magnitude equals $10,000. At the time of 
contracting, the risk of fire is objectively and subjectively 
unforeseeable. Therefore, X does not allocate the risk of fire 
contractually. Assume further that after the close of negotiations but 
before performance, a fire destroys X's factory. Y sues X for breach of 
performance, and X claims impracticability in defense. At this point, 
the court makes an ex post determination of the ex ante foreseeability of 
the risk of fire. The hindsight bias indicates that knowledge of a fire's 
occurrence will tend to cause a judge to overestimate an event's 
probability at the time of contracting.'^^ The hindsight bias may cause a 
judicial overestimation of Pg. Depending on the degree of 
overestimation, a court might determine that the fire, though actually 
unforeseeable, was foreseeable at the time of contracting. If a court 
makes such a determination, the court will deny the impracticability 
defense.''^ 
Psychologists have developed de-biasing techniques that may limit 
the effects of the hindsight bias. The ideal de-biasing technique 
prevents implicated parties fi"om learning in advance the actual 
outcome.'^" This technique, however, would be impractical in the 
context of § 2-615, because to determine whether performance should 
be excused, a judge will have to know what event allegedly rendered the 
contract impracticable. Other de-biasing techniques may prove useful 
in the context of the impracticability doctrine, especially those that 
restore an individual's consideration of alternative outcomes.'^' To 
SeeU.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. I (1994). 
™ See Worthington et al., supra 151 at 155; Holzl, supra note 153, at 437 ("When provided 
with information about the outcome of an event or about a correct solution, people tend to adjust 
their prior answers to match the 'correct' one more closely."). 
SeeV.C.C. § 2-615 cmt 1. 
180 See Worthington et al., supra note 151, at 156. For example, psychologists constructed a 
hypothetical case where a plaintiff sued a railroad company for personal injuries in an attempt to 
examine the effect of the hindsight bias on punitive damage awards. The study revealed that 
participants who lacked knowledge of the plaintiffs injury, i.e., those who did not know the 
outcome, rated the quality of the railroad company's decision higher than those who already knew 
the plaintiff had been injured. Most importantly, in the context of this Note, participants judging 
the defendant s actions in hindsight believed the accident was more foreseeable than those who 
lacked knowledge of the outcome. Id at 157. 
'8' Courts are aware of the hindsight bias, and have developed procedural mechanisms to 
minimize the effect of this cognitive distortion. Courts may bifhrcate issues in a given trial, so 
that jurors must decide the threshold question of liability before hearing any evidence on the 
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minimize the hindsight bias under the current foreseeability test, judges 
must be procedurally required to consider the possibility that an event 
was unforeseeable at the time of contracting. To date, no such de-
biasing technique exists for the impracticability doctrine under § 2-615. 
Although the hindsight bias raises a question as to the wisdom of 
an ex post determination of an event's foreseeability, no evidence exists 
that suggests that the hindsight bias effects ex post determinations of 
comparative values. Instead, a comparative analysis, like the one 
proposed by Posner and Rosenfield, might actually reduce or eliminate 
the effect of the hindsight bias.^^z Since the comparative analysis 
requires the determination of alternative outcomes without the need to 
know the ex post probability of an event's occurrence, the comparative 
analysis will minimize the effect of the hindsight bias.'^^ Indeed, it is 
theoretically plausible that this cognitive distortion will affect a court s 
determination of X and Y's transactions costs of determining the risk 
and magnitude of a given event by the same degree. If in hindsight a 
judge overestimates the value of TCE for each party by the same 
degree—a plausible consequence since the judge will likely view each 
value with the same set of biases—the hindsight bias in effect becomes 
a constant and will not distort the judge's determination of the superior 
risk bearer. 
E. Future Direction of the Impracticability Doctrine 
Where does this leave us? Do cognitive distortions render the 
foreseeability standard impracticable? Although more empirical 
research is needed to determine the extent to which cognitive distortions 
affect subjective probability assessments, the proven robustness of these 
behavioral phenomena draws into question the current reliance on a 
foreseeability standard.Therefore, a tentative solution would be to 
construct a test resistant to heuristics and cognitive biases. While 
Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test might be limited by a 
degree to which a plaintiff was injtired. Some commentators have suggested that this is a good 
way to minimize the hindsight bias in cases involving complex scientific evidence. See David B. 
Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental 
Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 135, 139-40 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991). 
182 The complex namre of Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test might also limit 
the effect of the hindsight bias. See Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think: 
Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 823 n.l 12 (noting that "die 
more decontextualized and abstract the analysis, the less likely it is to suffer from cognitive 
bias"). Note, however, that decontextualizing and abstracting analysis might come with its own 
problems, such as potentially de-humanizing the decision making process. 
183 See Worthington et al., supra note 151, at 156. 
184 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 114, at 335 (noting the pervasiveness of some cognitive biases); 
Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183 (same); Nickerson, supra 18, at 177 (same). 
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court's ability to determine the transaction costs of determining the 
probability and magnitude of a future event, their analysis provides a 
starting point for the construction of such a doctrine. 
Instead of requiring an assessment of foreseeability, the 
comparative analysis requires an ex post assessment of each party's cost 
of determining the event's probability and magnitude at the time of 
contracting plus any transaction costs associated with diversification. 185 
This test does not require a court to determine a given event's 
foreseeability at the time of contracting. It only requires a court to 
determine which party could have insured against the interfering 
outcome at a lower cost and denies the impracticability defense to the 
lowest cost insurer. If a lowest cost insurer cannot be judicially 
determined, contractual obligations are not discharged, a result 
supported by pacta sunt servanda. 
Although Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test might 
not lead to efficient exchanges of risk premiums and/or insurance at the 
contractual level, their comparative analysis at least provides a 
consistent standard to judge the effect of changed circumstances on 
contractual performance. A workable application of this test, which 
takes into account human cognitive limitations, will in turn lead to 
efficiency gains in general situations by placing liability on the lowest 
cost insurer, a proposition supported by commentators since the 
1920S.186 
CONCLUSION 
After centuries of development, the impracticability doctrine is 
limited by inconsistent case holdings and doctrinal confusion. Although 
micro-economists have attempted to provide clarity to the doctrine, their 
analysis lacks insight into how individuals make subjective probability 
assessments. While Paul Joskow noted that bounded rationality might 
explain the foreseeability standard, he did not take into account the 
effect that heuristics and cognitive biases have on subjective probability 
assessments and ex post judicial determinations of an outcome's 
probability. Over the past twenty-five years, psychologists and 
185 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 90-92. 
186 Ron Harris believes that law and eeonomics should rely on historical arguments to support 
propositions, because current scholars will then understand their place in developments of 
historical reasoning, theories, and research methods. Considering that the school of law and 
economics is relatively young and dominated by pure economists, this is a wise assertion. See 
Ron Harris, The Uses of History in Law and Economics, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 659, 659-
60 (2003). As such, Maurice Finkelstein asserted in 1920s that in the absence of fault, liability 
should attach to the lowest cost insurer. See Finkelstein, supra note 80, at 249-50. 
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economists have begun to model actual human decision-making, 
bringing to light the pervasiveness of availability heunstics, over-
optimism, the confirmation bias, and the hindsight bias Combined, 
these effects undermine § 2-615's reliance on a foreseeability standard. 
At the time of contracting, availability heuristics over-optimism, 
and the confirmatory bias affect subjective probability assessments, 
clouding the ability of parties to determine consistently whether or not a 
ie Lnt is objectively probable. If an -ent - "bjec w y 
foreseeable but behavioral distortions render it subjectively 
unforeseeable, parties will not allocate the risk of the foreseeable event 
either contractually (as required under § 2-615) or through the purchase 
of some to of insurance (as required under the superior nsk bearer 
The hindsight bias also suggests that on the judicial level, courts 
will overestimate the objective probability of a particular outcome 
thereby determining that some objectively 
foreseeable. In these situations, under § 2-615, courts will deny a party 
the impracticability defense even though the event was unforeseeable. 
Zwever, the comparative analysis of Posner and Rosenfield s 
superior risk bearer test circumvents cognitive biases and ^eumtics^ 
The test does not require courts to determine 
foreseeability at the time of contracting and minimizes the effect of the 
hindsight bias. It only requires the court to determine which . 
have inted against L Lerfering outcome at a lower -t, and ^  
the impracticability defense to the lowest cost f 
insurer cannot be judicially determined, then contractual obligations are 
"°^'^Whil?at times Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test 
might not lead to efficient exchanges of risk premiums and/or insurance 
at the contractual level, their comparative analysis provides a consiste 
standard to judge the effect of changed circumstances on conttactua 
performance. Therefore, in light of recent 
Lonomics and cognitive psychology, Posner and ^to 
provides the foundation for a new impracticability defense by sk g 
the discussion from foreseeability to an examination of each party s 
relative knowledge and access to risk diversification mechanisms. 
